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The IGC (Intergovernmental Conference) has come to dominate the public 
face of European Union decision-making - in Dutch now mostly referred to 
as Eurotop. The Commission’s otherwise excellent website acknowledges six 
IGCs in the life of the EU until 2001. However, this is not true. Missing 
from the list are two conferences sandwiched between the IGCs that 
founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom in 1955-57. One may 
also question the Commission’s claim that all have succeeded in achieving 
their objectives. Below I have presented the list of IGCs (until 2000) and 
their main results: 
 
 
1951 Treaty of Paris founding the ECSC 
1952 Treaty of Paris establishing a European Defence 
Community (EDC) 
1953-54 Rome/Paris Draft Treaty for a European (Political) 
Community (EPC) 
1955-57 Treaty of Rome founding the EEC and Euratom 
1985 Luxembourg, the Single European Act (SEA) 
‘completing’ the common market 
1990-91 Treaty of Maastricht  
establishing the European Union, Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
2000 Treaty of Nice 
 
 
Some of these IGCs have produced significant changes in the competencies 
of the Union and changes in the way it has functioned. Others have ended 
in a mixture of bafflement and disappointment. ‘Nice’ is a good example of 
the latter. One may envisage three basic explanatory frameworks, 
concentrating respectively on: 1) the nature of the issues, 2) the nature of 
the conflicts, and 3) the nature of the negotiations. The object of this article 
is to explore these possibilities using the history of IGCs. I will argue that 




one may question the effectiveness of the IGC method to ensure 
institutional progress within the European Union, as has been recently 
demonstrated in Rome. 
 
 
Success or failure? 
 
There can be no doubts about the success of the IGC leading to the first 
Treaty of Paris whereby the original Six (France, Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries) established the ECSC. The ECSC opened national 
markets for coal and steel under uniform conditions and provided 
(supranational) procedures for market regulation in times of shortages or 
gluts. It also established the basic institutional architecture for all 
subsequent communities, although the balance between the institutions 
would vary within each.1 
But the next two IGCs were marked by failure. The second IGC 
succeeded in producing the EDC treaty, which was indeed signed by all six 
parties, envisaging the creation of a European army. However, despite its 
specific (discriminatory) provisions limiting the freedom of German 
rearmament, it failed to satisfy the French, whose whole idea it had been in 
the first place.  
Successive attempts to renegotiate the treaty by strengthening the 
governmental grip in order to satisfy the Right in the French National 
Assembly only served to alienate the Centre-Left, and in the autumn of 
1954 the government finally abandoned its attempts to secure the treaty’s 
ratification.2 The collapse of the EDC treaty also buried the next IGC, 
which had been organized in anticipation of the EDC’s ratification - in 
order to provide a political framework for the two existing treaties (ECSC 
and EDC) and for any new communities that might be negotiated in the 
future. Its brief was soon widened to prepare provisions for future 
economic integration, and although the foundations of the EPC were 
destroyed by the EDC’s collapse, it was the economic side of the 
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negotiations that were to leave their legacy to the future.3 The possibility of 
negotiating a common market was left open to the next IGC, launched by 
the Six at Messina in June 1955. The French government was initially 
overtly sceptical and attached much more importance to the possibility of 
forming an atomic energy community. The Rome treaties created both, in 
the form of the EEC and Euratom. However, one can question whether the 
simple fact of a treaty should be seen as being synonymous with success. 
The IGC did produce a successful formula for a common market with 
detailed provisions governing the creation of a customs union, broader 
commitments and powers for the Commission in the areas of agriculture 
and total responsibility for formulating and administering rules of 
competition.4 The situation, however, was radically different for atomic 
energy where the initial intention was inter alia to provide for the joint 
construction and operation of a (very expensive) plant for uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing. This aspiration was ultimately defeated by the 
decision of the Six to accept an American offer of cheap fissionable material 
under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme. As a result, the French proceeded 
with their own nuclear program, and the Euratom treaty started life as a 
shell without a core.5  
A period of almost thirty years elapsed between the launch of the 
IGC in Messina and the next initiative along these lines. The next IGC 
culminated in the agreement on the Single European Act (1985), which 
provided for a vast legislative program aimed at the removal of non-tariff 
barriers to intra-community trade in both goods and services. This was a 
major achievement, but the IGC also left several issues either the subject of 
timid compromise or entirely unresolved. For example, cooperation in 
exchange-rate management was kept firmly outside the EEC treaty 
framework and only a small advance was made into the system of 
unanimous voting within the Council of Ministers and in expanding the 
powers of the European Parliament. In all three areas more ambitious 
reforms were rebuffed. Whether this restriction of focus represented 
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success or failure presumably depends of one’s assessment of the nature of 
the problems facing Europe and the process of European integration.6 
Monetary reform returned to the agenda with a vengeance when it became 
the centrepiece of a new IGC that was to culminate in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The treaty agreed to the goal of economic and monetary union, 
and procedures to effectuate this, but at the same time it provided opt-out 
clauses for Britain and Denmark. A social paragraph, again accompanied by 
opt-out clauses, did not even make it into the body of the treaty but was 
assigned instead to a separate protocol. There were also further extensions 
in the areas of majority voting, the powers of the European parliament and 
the role of foreign and security policy, albeit that the latter remained firmly 
intergovernmental in character. In retrospect, with a new common coinage 
destined to enter circulation in January 2002, it is easy to characterise the 
IGC as a success. Economic and monetary union challenges one of the core 
essences of state sovereignty. At the time of its signature, however, 
observers took a very different view. The fact that the Danes required two 
referenda to obtain the majority that would allow ratification, that the 
French only narrowly approved it, that the British prime-minister needed to 
survive a vote of confidence in parliament all pointed to a community that 
had overreached itself. There were many who stressed the need for a new 
IGC to ‘correct’ the shortcomings of Maastricht.7  
The IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam was considerably 
longer on rhetoric than it was on results. This may well have been the result 
of the calls for more openness after the SEA, and especially after the 
Maastricht ratification crisis. The agenda was possibly overcrowded, but this 
increased openness also meant that trade-offs and side-payments became 
more difficult to establish.8 Moreover, the actors in the IGC-process had 
become aware of the necessity to take ratification constraints into account.9 
Constitutional and institutional issues played a predominant role in the 1996 
IGC. The ‘threat’ of enlargement was used as a means to induce 
compromise. Some decisions were taken such as on the concept of 
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flexibility, the Schengen treaty and the strengthening of the first pillar at the 






It is possible that the success or failure of IGCs may lie in the nature of the 
issues being discussed or their number or complexity. Among the various 
approaches to this question, one of the oldest distinctions made by political 
scientists is between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. The implication drawn from 
this distinction is that agreement is simpler in areas of trade and economics 
(low politics) than in traditional areas of security and foreign policy (high 
politics). Another consideration that can be used in assessing the IGCs is 
whether negotiations are based on resolving single issues or on a complex 
of issues, the former situation allowing an IGC a clearer focus but depriving 
it of the possibility of trade-offs between issues.  
The distinction between high and low politics was originally 
employed by Haas to explain why spillover from one level of policy-making 
did not influence the other, and by Keohane and Nye to distinguish policy-
making in monetary policy from traditional security policy analysis.11 In 
practice it is difficult to separate high and low politics. The first IGC dealt 
with seemingly low political issues as coal and steel, but the strategic 
question of maintaining the output of heavy industry in the event of much 
of the continent being overrun in a future war was sufficient to keep Britain 
from joining.  
High politics formed the essence of the second IGC, with some 
overlap into the third. They took place at a time when NATO existed on 
little more than paper and when early German rearmament seemed essential 
for a credible strategy for forward defence in Western Europe. A European 
army (without an independent German high command and with restrictions 
on the German armaments industry) was only agreed because of German 
compliance, and the acquiescence of the then French government was 
bought only because of various clauses designed to allow the country to 
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pursue its colonial policy. The third IGC was required because the EDC 
treaty contained only temporary (and ultimately unsatisfactory) clauses over 
who was to control the foreign policy of the new community. That it did 
not stick to that restricted agenda, but spilled over into wider constitutional 
and economic questions, was a contributory factor to the collapse of the 
whole enterprise. 
High politics has been creeping back onto the agenda, but in a way 
that has still shrunk back from touching the core of political sovereignty. 
Even such a fundamental step as Economic and Monetary Union has led 
only to a technocratic change in monetary management, the creation of a 
new central bank, but also in the abdication of any direct political control. 
Commentators are sceptical over whether these arrangements will prove 
either effective or sufficient. Foreign and security policy has also been 
nudging its way to the fore, but again in a cautious way. Discussions have 
been kept intergovernmental and indeed the Single European Act was only 
‘single’ in stapling the separate pillars, with their separate decision-making 
structures, into a single document. One explanation for this cautious 
approach is that high politics has generally been kept away from the 
democratic process and that the EU lacks the legitimacy to assume such 
executive tasks of government.12 On the security front, too, progress is 
cautious and possibly insufficient. The Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 may 
look impressive in the light of what has preceded it, but it needs to be seen 
in the context of a military might of close on two million currently available 
to EU member states. It is also likely to be inadequate if Europe is ever 
confronted alone simultaneously with two crises of Bosnian dimensions.13 
Single-issue negotiations within the EU’s history are rare. As we have 
already observed, the first IGC dealing with coal and steel prompted the 
UK government to consider security issues. However, with coal, iron and 
steel making up over half of the bulk of rail transport, it impinged on 
transport policy and - at a time when differential freight rates was a 
favoured measure in promoting regional development - on regional policy 
as well. The second IGC dealt not only with the formation of a European 
army but, through provisions for a common procurement system, it 
impinged also on arms production and joint Research and Development 
projects. The third IGC not only negotiated a framework for the existing 
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communities, but made provision for extending the range of competencies 
(much to the horror of most of the participating governments) starting with 
the economic sphere. The classic case of ‘linkage’ however is afforded by 
the fourth IGC that addressed jointly the questions of atomic energy and 
the common market. At the start of the negotiations, the French 
government was thoroughly sceptical about a common market and it is 
probably only because of the prospect of an atomic energy community that 
they were at the negotiating table at all. Even when a more favourable 
government came to power in January 1956, the fact that the two issues 
were kept linked, inter alia on the insistence of the Germans, helped 
maintain momentum on the common market. 
The opportunities afforded by issue-linkage are readily acknowledged 
by both neo-realists and neo-liberals, especially within the context of 
international organisations. The importance each side attaches to this 
phenomenon varies only with their assessment of states’ ambitions within 
the international setting.14 By dealing simultaneously with various issues, the 
parties increase the chances of achieving success by allowing the trade-offs 
that result in a satisfactory deal for all concerned. The problem with 
linkages is that the only criterion for measuring their success is their success 
itself. Had the respective IGCs failed, the interpretation of the usefulness of 
the links would have altered. The IGC leading to the Maastricht treaty, 
which, in my view, produced the greatest step forward in the EU’s history 
since the foundation of the EEC, was condemned at the time for delivering 
results that were too ambitious, too cluttered and too opaque. For these 
reasons, the IGC risked complete failure by jeopardising the ratification 
process. The IGC leading to the Amsterdam treaty initiated steps that, by 
formalising procedures that would allow states to opt-out of specific 
policies, specifically diluted the necessity for achieving unanimous 
agreement on every point. If this becomes the norm, opt-outs will become 
the substitute for trade-offs, and the opaqueness of the package-deal will be 
replaced by the fragmentation of overlapping issue areas with different 
memberships and different rules. The IGC leading to the Nice treaty 
avoided taking this path but once more an overfull agenda was seen as 
leading to disappointing results.  
Whilst this IGC may have exasperated those commentators 
concerned with the lack of democracy and transparency in the entire IGC 
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process, some political scientists seemingly turned necessity into a virtue, 
using the ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making. They argue that 
agreement is actually facilitated by a lack of coherent framework of problem 
preferences, by an unclear decision-making structure and by participants 
who are not uniformly committed to all issues. They also contend that the 
more imperfect the information is among policy makers, the more 
important the role of a policy entrepreneur will be.15 We will return to this 





It is always unlikely that governments arrive at an IGC with similar 
standpoints on all issues, or even with an agreement over which issues 
should be regarded as high priorities. Thus, by itself, the fact that 
disagreements occur is unimportant. What we need to do, therefore, is to 
qualify the role that such disagreements might play in determining the 
success or failure of the outcomes. A first distinction that needs to be 
drawn is the nature of the agreement itself. Does it touch a fundamental 
national interest, whatever that may be, or does it reflect the policy 
preference, for whatever reason, of the government in power? Then we 
have to examine a second distinction. Is the outcome the result of a straight 
bargaining process to secure the maximum national advantage for each state 
or does it reflect a more consensual process where all participants strive 
towards the ultimate goal of securing a ratifyable agreement? 
The idea of national interest as a driving force for integration dates 
back to mid-1960s when Stanley Hoffmann denied that integration was 
weakening the nation state. He argued that some issues were simply too 
large to be resolved within national contexts and that, by agreeing to 
surrender some sovereignty, states emerged stronger in these areas, and 
more capable of realising their aims.16 This concept was revived and placed 
it in the historical context by Alan Milward. The argument now went that 
integration represented such a challenge to state sovereignty that states 
would only agree to surrender some if the issue were so important as to 
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threaten their very survival.17 These positions are close to the realist position 
but other nuances are possible. As a leading member of the ‘liberal 
intergovernmentalist’ school, Moravcsik refers to state preferences, which 
may reflect domestic pressures, rather than to national interest, which 
diminishes the somewhat deterministic nature of the latter. He then 
proceeds to note that these interests appear to be primarily economically 
motivated and remain remarkably stable over time.18 These concepts are 
difficult to test, certainly in the space available. However, one obvious 
check is whether what appears at one moment to represent a national 
imperative is the subject of short-term change. Take, for example, the 
fourth IGC that created the EEC. At the start of the negotiations it 
appeared absolutely impossible that the then French government would 
ever countenance the idea of economic integration, and for this reason 
Monnet had been sceptical about including it in the Benelux memorandum 
that ‘relaunched’ Europe after the failure of the EDC. However, in January 
1956 a more pro-European coalition took office and France’s hostility 
subsided. Although French negotiators still drove a hard bargain, they 
signed and ratified the EEC treaty and, under a Gaullist government, 
implemented it without employing any of the escape clauses included in the 
treaty. There was another partner in the early negotiations, whose presence 
is often forgotten, and that was the United Kingdom. After a few months it 
withdrew from the IGC, the government having determined that for 
various reasons it could not join a common market. Five years later, with 
the same Conservative government in power, the UK was taking the 
decision to apply for EEC membership. 
For British audiences, the IGC leading to the Maastricht treaty will 
be familiar for the Conservative government’s determined opposition to the 
‘social paragraph’. Time and again government spokesmen explained that its 
implementation would cripple the competitiveness of British industry and, 
for this reason, it could not be accepted. The social paragraph was not 
included in the treaty but in a separate protocol and the government won 
the right to opt-out of its adoption and implementation. This would appear 
a classic case of national interest, were it not for the fact that one of the first 
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acts of a new Labour government on coming to power was to announce the 
country’s acceptance of the full provisions of the social paragraph. The 
announcement caused no uproar among the business elite. On the contrary, 
the public reaction was surprisingly mute. 
If governments’ negotiating positions are not always immutable, we 
might also question whether, when they are confronted with each other in 
an IGC, the result is an implacable struggle to preserve entrenched national 
interests.19 Moravcsik in particular emphasises the key role played by 
governments in interstate relations and particularly the power of large states 
to exercise a de facto veto over important issues. The outcome, therefore, is 
closest to the lowest common denominator of large states interests.20 
Therefore, while all participants in intergovernmental negotiations are intent 
on maximising their own positions, the strongest parties will emerge as the 
winners, and the (often messy) end-result will be the coincidence of the 
outcomes of the compromises needed to secure the acceptance of all 
parties. Of course, all is lost if the agreement is not accepted.  
IGCs are unique in that their agreements require ratification (by 
achieving a majority either in national parliaments or in referenda) by all 
parties. This suggests that all participants have to be mindful of the need 
that each has to mobilise domestic support for the outcome. In this light, 
the strongest state is the one with the most solid command of a domestic 
majority; it could accept various outcomes and still secure ratification. The 
weakest state is one that has to walk a tightrope to secure a successful 
outcome, and it may be helped by its partners by such devices as the 
granting of opt-out provisions and by the inclusion of side-payments 
(extraneous issues upon which extra concessions may be granted) that will 
help it secure a parliamentary or public majority. In this scenario the 
weakest state will emerge as the ‘winner’ and the (still messy) end result will 
reflect the opt-outs, concessions and side-payments needed to help it secure 
ratification.21 
Let us return to two of the examples we have considered above. 
During the IGC leading to the EEC, the French government acquired a 
whole slate of concessions from the other parties. Among the specifically 
French demands that eventually found their way into the treaty were special 
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provisions for the colonies, clauses to allow one party to postpone adopting 
treaty provisions (a kind of delayed opt-in) and clauses on ‘social 
harmonisation’. The latter bore all the trammels of a side-payment since all 
it boiled down to was a standardisation of the working hours after which 
overtime would be paid, the phased introduction of equal pay for women 
and the standardisation of the number of paid holidays. Granted that the 
French balance-of-payments was not the strongest, but these measures 
would have made little difference except in widening the base of 
parliamentary support. Throughout the IGC the negotiators were 
continuously aware that the French government’s parliamentary support 
was fragile and that new elections would probably produce a parliament less 
favourable than the current one. The fate of the treaty of Rome, with its far 
ranging economic provisions, hung on that (one-shot) parliamentary vote. 
During the IGC leading to the Maastricht treaty it would have been 
equally impossible not to have been aware of the weakness of the British 
Conservative government. John Major was severely restricted by the weak 
support he had in parliament. He used this restriction to his advantage 
however, by arguing that he could not give in to certain points as it would 
be unacceptable to parliament. In this situation, rather than face a stalemate, 
the other negotiating partners allowed the UK to remain behind whilst they 
reached an agreement among themselves.22 Once again, the shape of the 
agreement, and the concessions awarded, reflected weakness rather than 
strength. And the opaqueness of the result reflected the compromises 





The series of IGCs within the EU have two distinct institutional qualities. 
In the first place they are all designed to produce new international 
agreements and therefore play themselves out in a framework where 
national governments (or, more accurately, the executive elites of those 
governments) are required to interact in arriving at an outcome. Moravcsik 
once argued that elites were growing to like this kind of arrangement since it 
offered them scope for national (and domestic) agenda-setting and 
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enhanced their own position within national decision-making structures.23 
Secondly, they take place within an existing international institution. Most 
political scientists, even realists, concede that international institutions, with 
their distinct rules and procedures, can and do influence state behaviour and 
the outcomes of inter-state bargaining. Among international organisations, 
however, the European Union is more intrusive than most. The various 
treaties have given the European Commission, and to a lesser extent the 
European Parliament, a privileged position in agenda setting, allowing them 
to play the role of policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, the central position of 
the Commission in policy preparation and implementation, combined with 
the strong role assigned to the national permanent representatives, allows it 
extra scope in mediation between states. Finally, the Commission has 
acquired a formidable array of European-level lobby groups and think-tanks 
that allow it to mobilise different strata of interest groups behind its ideas.24 
The first four IGCs that took place in the 1950s did not benefit from 
the services of an international secretariat, far less from the guidance of a 
supranational Commission. The first two, leading to the ECSC and EDC 
respectively, were effectively directed from French Commissariat du Plan, 
under the leadership of Jean Monnet. Monnet himself took charge of the 
ECSC negotiations and dispatched his associate Etienne Hirsch to take care 
of the EDC. The third IGC, leading to the Political Community, took a 
different route. In this case the parliament of the ECSC, albeit in an 
amended form, was charged with preparing the draft treaty upon which the 
subsequent IGC would deliberate. Since, however, the federal complexion 
of the work it produced was in advance of what most governments were 
prepared to accept, it was thereafter excluded from much of the IGC 
deliberation. The IGC leading to the EEC and Euratom employed neither 
the services of the High Authority of the ECSC nor the advice of its 
parliament, although leading members of the ECSC staff, notably Hans von 
der Groeben and Pierre Uri, did play an important role in a personal 
capacity. By and large, therefore, the first four IGCs operated each within 
its own institutional construction, without any of the supposed benefits of 
an existing international framework. 
The Commission and especially its president, Jacques Delors, were 
extremely visible in the IGCs leading to the SEA and to the Treaty of 
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Maastricht, especially the EMU. For both treaties, the Commission wrote 
the report that became the basis for negotiations and, in the case of the 
SEA, played an important role as participant in the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs (the Dooge Committee). Obviously these drafts were 
written with national preferences in mind and national governments did 
have the last say, but the procedures conformed to the rights of initiative 
embedded in the structure of the EU. Writing in 1991 Moravcsik analysed 
the SEA solely in terms of an intergovernmental (lowest common 
denominator) bargain.25 In 1999, however, he was prepared to concede that 
the SEA was the only treaty where supranational institutions helped to 
improve effectiveness.26 This brought him into line with the majority 
opinion. Dinan saw the SEA as an example of the European Commission 
in the role of policy entrepreneur27 and Sandholtz and Zysman emphasize 
the importance of the Commission’s leadership as a necessary precondition 
for integration: ‘The Commission, aided by business, was able to mobilize a 
coalition of governmental elites that favoured the overall objective of 
market unification.’28 
There is little doubt that these IGCs were driven by the Commission, 
but whilst this may have facilitated the achievement of agreement among 
member states and may have marked considerable steps forward of the road 
towards an ‘ever deeper union’, there were already signs that all was not 
well. The ratification crisis surrounding the Treaty of Maaastricht and the 
currency crisis that soon enveloped the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
shattered the elan surrounding the Commission. Criticism surrounding 
Delors autocratic style began to surface and the need was expressed to 
widen the scope of consultation in the preparatory phase of the next IGC.29 
This led to procedures whereby no less than four ‘interinstitutional 
conferences’ were called between the European Parliament and the 
Commission and a Reflection Group, consisting of representatives of the 
member states and the Commission and chaired by Carlos Westendorp, was 
entrusted with drafting the report that served as the basis for further 
negotiation.  
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With the 1996 IGC both the spread of information and the network 
of participation were widened. Moreover, the introduction of qualified 
majority voting increased the nature of EU diplomacy and contributed to a 
greater fluidity in negotiating alliances that shifted from issue to issue. At 
the same time, although the member states, nervous in the aftermath of 
Maastricht, excised the more controversial issues from the agenda30, the 
prospect of EU enlargement served as a complicating agent in the 
subsequent negotiations.31 According to the ‘garbage can’ model, in this 
situation one would expect the role of the Commission as policy 
entrepreneur, and the only agent capable of overseeing everything, to have 
been enhanced. However, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis come to the opposite 
conclusion. They observe that since the last two IGCs were announced in 
the preceding treaty, governments knew about them years in advance and 
were in a good information position. Pollack reaches the conclusion that in 
this information-rich environment the opportunities for entrepreneurial 





The disappointing results of the IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and the IGC in Nice must call into question the entire IGC method of 
institutional progress within the European Union. The Treaty of Nice may 
have achieved the institutional reform necessary to allow the EU to expand 
its membership and therefore to perpetuate its (questionable) decision-
making effectiveness. However, even at the time, it was acknowledged to be 
a stop-gap measure until a new ‘Convention’ had been agreed. The 
procedure for the Convention differed in one important respect from its 
predecessors by trying to ‘tie-in’ potential decision-makers. The Convention 
included therefore not only members of the European parliament and the 
Commission, but also representatives from national parliaments and 
governments; even representatives from future member-states. If they were 
involved in the work, they might be less cavalier in their final judgement. 
However, the Convention maintained a large role for the steering power of 
chair, held by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and this may ultimately have been 
its undoing. The IGC to consider its fate in December 2003 took less than 
                                                                 
30 Hug and König, In view of ratification. 
31 Sverdrup, Precedents and present events in the European Union. 




one weekend to fall apart. The ostensible reason was Spanish and Polish 
displeasure at changes in the weighing of votes and representation in the 
European parliament. But behind that lurked the difficulty of the objection 
of the ‘small states’ to the change in the number of Commissioners, and one 
step behind that lay several British ‘red lines’ defining the policy areas that 
would remain in national hands. 
Although Nice has kept the decision-making machinery functioning, 
it has failed to address the larger issue of political legitimacy, in which both 
the functioning of the Commission and the Parliament, and the character of 
the IGC method are perceived as the core of the problem – bureaucracy in 
the service of an executive elite. No amount of tinkering with the rules can 
resolve the public’s increasing alienation from the European objectives that 
these institutional arrangements are supposed to serve. Indeed there seems 
to be little recognition among the elites that their institutional arrangements 
might be part of the problem rather than part of the solution.  
At the time of writing, it appears that a compromise on the 
Constitution may yet emerge, but whether it will survive the test of voters’ 
approval in the various referenda, already promised or still to emerge, 
remains to be seen. But the process will not stop there. As more members 
join, or new issues emerge or new weaknesses become apparant in the area 
of European governance, there will be new calls for reform. The irony is 
that, in the absence of any agreed alternative, we will probably have to 
return to the mechanism of yet another IGC to respond to these demands, 
even though it has demonstrated itself to be a sub-optimal way of making 
progress. The philosopher George Santayana once remarked that ‘those 
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it’, but the 
European Union seems condemned to this route in full recognition of its 
limitations. In this case one is rather forced to agree with Hegel: ‘what 
experience and history teach is this – that nations and governments have 
never learned anything from history, or acted upon any of the lessons that 
might be drawn from it’. 
 
